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Note
Increasing E-Quality in Rural America:
U.S. Spectrum Policy and Adverse Possession
Lindsey L. Tonsager∗
Americans across the country are cutting the cords of their
communications devices.1 In 2004, the wireless telecommunications services industry grew three times faster than the national economy, contributing $118 billion in revenue and $92
billion to the gross domestic product.2 Meanwhile, wireless
“hotspots” are popping up everywhere from coffee shops in New
York City to a municipal-wide system in Chaska, Minnesota.3
Consumers increasingly expect their communications services
to provide mobility, an always-on connection, and advanced
services offering voice, video, and data in one device. Moreover,
communications devices are not just for personal communications: the public safety community, local and national businesses, and educational institutions increasingly rely on such
services.4
Because wireless communications services transmit information over the electromagnetic spectrum, however, a pro∗ J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2004,
University of Pennsylvania. The author thanks Dean Jim Chen for his
thoughtful comments and insight; editors David Leishman, Stephanie Bitterman and Marci Windsheimer for their assistance; and Keith Tonsager for his
patience and support. Copyright © 2006 by Lindsey L. Tonsager.
1. See Wireless Substitution in Full Swing, Says Study, RCR WIRELESS
NEWS, Sept. 19, 2005, at 30 (noting that Americans are increasingly preferring
cell phones to land-line phone services).
2. Susan Polyakova, Study: Wireless Industry Contributes $92 Billion to
U.S. Economy, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 4, 2005, at 1, 1, available at 2005 WLNR
16027163.
3. New Technologies, COMM. DAILY, May 27, 2004, at 1, 3, available at
2004 WLNR 6957999.
4. See, e.g., Kevin J. Martin, FCC Chairman Martin Comments on Commission’s Amendment Emergency Alert System (EAS) Rules to Include Digital
Media Technologies, U.S. FED. NEWS, Nov. 3, 2005, at 1, available at 2005
WLNR 17829277; Amol Sharma, Web Phones Complicate 9-1-1 Technology
Needs, CQ WKLY, Oct. 10, 2005, at 2704, 2704–05.
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vider’s services are limited according to whether adequate spectrum is accessible. Unfortunately, spectrum policy in the
United States has failed to facilitate deployment of communications networks in rural America,5 where network deployment is
costly and customers are few.6 Consequently, many rural consumers remain unserved or underserved,7 while the rest of the
country undergoes an advanced wireless services revolution.
Even when rural consumers have access to a particular communications service, the quality or speed of that service is often
subpar. For example, the percentage of zip codes with broadband lines in service is lowest in rural America.8 Although
many rural consumers own cell phones, most receive only analog service because digital signal coverage is sparse.9 In some
5. See Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural
Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based Services, 33 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1162, 1246 (Sept.
27, 2004) [hereinafter Spectrum-Based Services] (statement of Comm’r Michael J. Copps) (“Anyone who lives in rural America knows first hand that rural consumers have fewer choices of carriers, more holes in their coverage, and
that there are still areas of our country that have no service at all.”).
6. See Comments of the National Telecommunications Cooperative
Association, Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural
Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to
Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT Docket No. 02-381, at 4 (Dec. 29, 2003),
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=
6515383228 [hereinafter Comments of the NTCA 2003]; Comments of the
Organization for the Promotion and Advancement of Small Telecommunications Companies and the Rural Telecommunications Group, Facilitating
the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural Areas and Promoting
Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based
Services, WT Docket No. 02-381, at 13 (Dec. 29, 2003), http://gullfoss2.fcc
.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6515383203
[hereinafter Comments of OPASTCO].
7. See Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets, 30 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F)
2067, 2068–69 (Nov. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Efficient Use of Spectrum 2000]
(discussing “the problem of underserved rural areas”); Jillian Lloyd, ‘Digital
Age’ Skirts Rural America, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 31, 1998, at 1.
8. See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FCC, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR
INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004, at 5 (2005), http://www
.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/hspd0705.pdf
(“[A]s of December 31, 2004, high-speed subscribers are reported to be present
in 99% of the most densely populated zip codes and in 75% of zip codes with
the lowest population densities.”). The FCC defined “high-speed” as having a
transmission delivery rate “to the subscriber at a speed in excess of 200 kbps
in at least one direction.” Id. at 2.
9. See Chet Brokaw, State Sees Hang-ups with Switch to Digital, ABERDEEN AM. NEWS (S.D.), July 16, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 WLNR
11168807.
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areas, even analog coverage is unreliable.10 Recognizing this
problem, the Federal Communications Commission issued a notice of proposed rulemaking.11 The proceeding seeks to encourage deployment of communications networks and improve access to spectrum in rural America.12 As of this writing, the
proceeding is still open before the Commission.13
This Note argues that new and novel policy changes are
necessary to ensure that rural residents are not left behind in
the communications revolution. Part I discusses characteristics
of the electromagnetic spectrum and spectrum management
policy in the United States. Part II details why current methods of spectrum allocation fall short of ensuring access to communications services in rural America. Part III argues that the
Federal Communications Commission should enact regulations
modeled after the doctrine of adverse possession as a means for
a communications service provider to obtain a license transfer
for spectrum. This Note concludes that adopting such a proposal would establish an economically efficient means of ensuring access to advanced services for consumers who historically
have been underserved or not served at all.
I. UNITED STATES SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT POLICY
The Federal Communications Commission is charged with
the formulation and enforcement of the nation’s spectrum policy,14 which requires determining how to allocate, allot, and assign spectrum among parties other than the federal government.15 One must be familiar with the characteristics of
spectrum and current United States spectrum management
policy to understand how modifications to current policy will
increase access to communications services in rural America.

10. Sam Burrish, Frustrations Build Over Cellular Gaps, ARGUS LEADER
(Sioux Falls, S.D.), July 17, 2005, at 1D, available at http://www.argusleader
.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050717/BUSINESS/507170344/1003.
11. Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5, at 1162; see also FCC,
Proceedings and Initiatives: Spectrum-Based Services in Rural Areas,
http://wireless.fcc.gov/spectrum/proceeding_details.htm?proid=292 (last visited
Apr. 10, 2006) (collecting notices and releases related to the proceeding).
12. See Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5.
13. For updates and further information, see FCC, supra note 11.
14. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
15. See HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW 239
(1999). The National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) manages use of spectrum by the federal government. Id. at 238.
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A. CHARACTERISTICS OF SPECTRUM
Understanding how and why the federal government manages spectrum use requires an appreciation of the nature of
electromagnetic waves and the electromagnetic spectrum, how
information is conveyed over electromagnetic waves, and the
physical limitations of spectrum. Electromagnetic waves are
characterized by their frequency, wavelength, and amplitude.16
The following diagram represents these concepts.

B
A

C
Time

From point A to point B is one cycle. Frequency is the
number of cycles per second and is measured in hertz; wavelength is the distance the wave travels in one cycle.17 The distance C represents the wave’s amplitude, which determines the
signal’s strength.18 The electromagnetic spectrum can be conceptualized as a long electromagnetic wave with an everincreasing frequency, with very low frequency waves at one end
and cosmic rays at the other.19
Communications devices operate using only a small portion
of the electromagnetic spectrum, known as the radio spectrum.
This portion includes those electromagnetic waves with fre16. WALTER B. EMERY, BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT 99 (1971).
17. Id.
18. Kulpreet Singh, The FCC’s Pioneer’s Preference Policy: An Innovative
Idea Grows Old and Weary, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 143, 147
(1996).
19. See EMERY, supra note 16, at 100; Nat’l Telecomm. Info. Admin.,
United States Frequency Allocations: The Radio Spectrum (2003), http://www
.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/allochrt.pdf.
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quencies ranging from 3 kHz to 400 GHz.20 The FCC has divided the radio spectrum into several bands of frequencies that
it then allocates for particular services.21 Radios and televisions, for example, operate at lower frequencies of the radio
spectrum. Mobile phones generally operate somewhere in the
middle, and satellite television operates on the higher end of
the radio spectrum.22
Different signal frequencies within this spectrum have different propagation characteristics. Some frequencies rapidly
diminish in intensity and therefore are capable of traveling
only short distances, whereas other frequencies are capable of
traveling thousands of miles.23 Some frequencies are able to
penetrate structures like concrete buildings,24 while tree
leaves25 and rain26 easily frustrate others. These propagation
characteristics partially explain why a radio station fades out
as one drives away from the transmitting tower. They also explain why “bunny-ear” television broadcast receivers work well
indoors, while a satellite dish requires placement outside or
near a window.
Thousands of wireless communications devices and a wide
range of technologies rely on spectrum to transmit information.
They include mobile phones, wireless internet, broadcast television, satellites, remote-controlled toys, and even garage door
openers. Information in the form of voice, video, or data is
transposed onto these electromagnetic waves, allowing for
point-to-point and multipoint information transfer.27 After one
enters information into an input device, like a microphone,28 a
transmitter converts the voice, video, or data into an electronic
signal through the process of modulation.29 This signal travels

20. See 47 C.F.R. § 2.106 (2005); NAT’L TELECOMM. INFO. ADMIN., supra
note 19.
21. 47 C.F.R. § 2.106; NAT’L TELECOMM. INFO. ADMIN., supra note 19.
22. 47 C.F.R. § 2.106; NAT’L TELECOMM. INFO. ADMIN., supra note 19.
23. See EMERY, supra note 16, at 100–02.
24. See Robert K. Morrow Jr. & Theodore S. Rappaport, Getting In, WIRELESS REV., Mar. 1, 2000, at 42, 42–44.
25. Tim Kridel, Foliage Spoilage, WIRELESS REV., March 1, 2000, at 50,
50–51.
26. Mike Mead, Propagation Impairment at 28GHz, AM.’S NETWORK, June
15, 1998, at S-17, S-17 to -19.
27. See ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 234–38.
28. See ROGER L. FREEMAN, TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRANSMISSION
HANDBOOK 1–2 (4th ed. 1998).
29. Singh, supra note 18, at 148.
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through the air and a receiver, like a radio, intercepts it. The
receiver converts the signal back to voice, video, or data
through the process of demodulation.30
Interference, however, frustrates these radio transmissions. Interference manifests as a snowy television channel, a
crackling radio station, or a garage door that refuses to open.31
It occurs when another signal operates on the same or an adjacent channel and is sufficiently powerful.32 For example, an FM
radio station listener sometimes may hear two programs competing against each other—each station fading in and out between unintelligible static. As one station’s signal gets sufficiently weaker than the other, the stronger signal is audible.
However, when each is relatively equal in strength, the listener
hears static.
If the supply of spectrum were infinite, providers would not
have to worry about operating too closely to another channel.
Spectrum is not an infinite resource, though. Only a limited
number of operators may utilize the spectrum at any given
time without causing interference.33 Consequently, spectrum
scarcity is different from that of gasoline or water—one user’s
“consumption of a broadcast signal does not exhaust or reduce
what can be received by others.”34 Consumption of a broadcast
signal thus poses no supply difficulties; however, increased
transmission does. It may be useful to think of spectrum as a
dance floor. The dance floor can accommodate many dancers,
the communications operators. They can move across the floor
among each other, each dancer occupying a portion of the floor.
However, at some point too many dancers will make the dance
floor too crowded, and people will start stepping on each other’s
feet and bumping into each other.
New technology and compression techniques use existing
spectrum more efficiently and increase the range of available
spectrum.35 For example, the conversion from analog to digital

30. See FREEMAN, supra note 28, at 1–2.
31. See Elizabeth Williamson, Stuck in the Driveway for Security: New
Emergency Radio System Jams Garage Openers, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2005,
at C5.
32. See id.
33. See Adam Cain, Comment, Satellite Radio: An Innovative Technology’s
Path Through the FCC and into the Future, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L.
JUDGES 223, 228 (2005).
34. ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 228.
35. See id.
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allows for more content in the same amount of bandwidth.36
Additionally, new devices can operate using higher frequencies
than were previously available.37 At the same time, however,
demand for spectrum increases as new services and devices
emerge.38 Therefore, it is unlikely that interference concerns
will subside in the near future. In response, spectrum management policy seeks to encourage the development of spectrum-efficient technologies and to otherwise minimize the risk
of interference.
B. THE FCC LICENSING REQUIREMENT
The foundation of spectrum management policy lies in the
FCC’s licensing scheme. The FCC assigns licenses for the use of
the electromagnetic spectrum39 and prohibits persons without a
license from transmitting signals over much of the radio spectrum.40 The licensing system aims to prevent interference and
to protect and promote the public interest.41 It also allows the
federal government to retain control over spectrum management, preventing individual parties from claiming bands of
spectrum as private property. The Telecommunications Act
states:
It is the purpose of this chapter . . . to maintain the control of the
United States over all the channels of radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by
persons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal

36. See, e.g., Anne Marie Squeo & Joe Flint, Move to Digital Pits TV Stations Against Cable, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2005, at B4 (noting that television
stations are able to split their current analog signals into as many as six different digital signals).
37. ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 228.
38. See id.
39. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
40. See, e.g., id.; FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474
(D.C. Cir. 1940) (“The fundamental purpose of Congress in respect of broadcasting was the allocation and regulation of the use of radio frequencies by
prohibiting such use except under license.”). Devices such as garage door
openers, and services such as wireless internet, operate on unlicensed spectrum. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 15.301–.323 (2005).
41. Writers Guild of Am. v. ABC, 609 F.2d 355, 362 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he
Communications Act makes the interests of the public paramount.”); Todisco
v. United States, 298 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1961) (“[T]he purpose of the licensing law is to prevent interference with radio communications.”); WOKO,
Inc. v. FCC, 109 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (“The underlying policy of the
Communications Act is the securing and protection of the public interest.”).
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authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any right,
beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.42

The license is also subject to modification43 and revocation.44 Nevertheless, licensees possess several significant property interests in the spectrum, including the right to lease, disaggregate, and partition excess spectrum through secondary
markets.45 Additionally, incumbent broadcasters have a renewal expectancy, which “is a presumption in favor of license
renewal.”46 These property interests are commonly referred to
as the licensee’s “quasi-property rights.”47
The public interest standard guides the Commission’s decision to grant or deny an application for a license. Under this
standard, the Commission must “determine, in the case of each
application filed with it . . . whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served by the granting of such application.”48 In choosing between mutually exclusive applications for a license, the FCC must “grant the license or permit to
a qualified applicant through a system of competitive bidding.”49 Consequently, the Commission often uses auctions to
allocate spectrum licenses and awards the licenses to the highest bidder.50 The spectrum license indicates the particular fre42. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (emphasis added); see also id. § 304 (“No station license shall be granted . . . until the applicant therefor shall have waived any
claim to the use of any particular frequency or of the electromagnetic spectrum
as against the regulatory power of the United States because of the previous
use of the same, whether by license or otherwise.” (emphasis added)); Sanders
Bros., 309 U.S. at 475 (“The policy of the Act is clear that no person is to have
anything in the nature of a property right as a result of the granting of a license.”); Trinity Methodist Church, S. v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850, 853 (D.C. Cir.
1932).
43. 47 U.S.C. § 316 (2000).
44. Id. § 312.
45. See L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 170 F.2d 793, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1948)
(“[T]he right under a license for a definite term . . . is more than a mere privilege or gratuity.”); Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5, at 1166 n.20, 1173
(discussing partitioning and disaggregation); Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets, 30 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 661, 665 (Oct. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Efficient
Use of Spectrum 2003] (discussing the right to lease).
46. J. Gregory Sidak, An Economic Theory of Censorship, 11 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 81, 98–100 (2004).
47. See, e.g., Joseph M. Ward, Comment, Secondary Markets in Spectrum:
Making Spectrum Policy As Flexible As the Spectrum Market It Must Foster,
10 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 103, 111 (2001).
48. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (2000).
49. Id. § 309(j).
50. See Ward, supra note 47, at 110 (2001). For an example of how a spec-
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quencies, geographic area covered, particular services to be
provided, and technologies that may be used.51 The license is
statutorily limited, generally to eight or ten years, at which
time the licensee must apply for renewal.52 The statute prohibits any unauthorized transmission.53
Under Congressional mandate, the Commission must give
particular attention to communications services in rural areas.
The Commission’s purpose is to ensure access to wire and radio
communications “to all the people of the United States.”54 Additionally, the statutory scheme specifically requires the FCC to
fashion its licensing system so as to ensure access to communications services in rural America. Section 309 provides:
In identifying classes of licenses and permits to be issued by competitive bidding, in specifying eligibility and other characteristics of such
licenses and permits, and in designing the methodologies for use under this subsection, the Commission shall . . . seek to promote . . . the
development and rapid deployment of new technologies, products, and
services for the benefit of the public, including those residing in rural
areas . . . .55

In light of this responsibility, the FCC has adopted several
allocation methods and put forth several proposals to make certain that rural providers not only are able to participate in the
spectrum auction, but can also access the capital necessary to
compete in the spectrum marketplace.
C. CURRENT AND PROPOSED SPECTRUM ALLOCATION METHODS
The Commission has taken several steps to facilitate rural
providers’ participation in license auctions. One step has been
to grant licenses based on geographic areas.56 The Commission

trum auction is conducted, see Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services
in the 1.7 GHz and 2.1 GHz Bands, 36 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 648 (Aug. 5,
2005) [hereinafter Service Rules].
51. Evan R. Kwerel & John R. Williams, Moving Toward a Market for
Spectrum, 16 REG. 53, 53–54 (1993).
52. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1) (2000) (limiting a license for the operation of
a broadcasting station to eight years); 47 C.F.R. § 27.13 (2005) (setting the license period for various frequencies at either eight or “up to ten” years).
53. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
54. Id. § 151 (emphasis added).
55. Id. § 309(j)(3)–(4).
56. See Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Dedicated
Short-Range Communication Services in the 5.850-5.925 GHz Band (5.9 GHz
Band), 31 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 2121, 2134–35 (Nov. 15, 2002) [hereinafter
Rules Regarding 5.9 GHz Band] (discussing the advantages of geographic licensing).
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allocates spectrum at auction by using geographic-area licensing,57 which authorizes the licensee to operate on the relevant
frequency anywhere within the specified geographic area.58 The
Commission divides auctioned spectrum into several frequency
blocks59 and assigns each band a geographic designation.60 This
designation indicates how many licenses the Commission will
auction in each particular band. The designations range from
large license areas, like the regional economic area groupings
(REAGs), to small areas, such as cellular market areas
(CMAs).61 Under the REAG method, the Commission awards
twelve licenses, of which only six are in the continental United
States.62 In comparison, there are 734 CMA licenses63 and 176
economic area (EA) licenses.64 The number of licenses correlates inversely with the size of the area—the more licenses, the
smaller the size of each geographic area. The size of a geographic area for a particular frequency block, therefore, can
vary significantly depending on its designation.
The Commission offers both large and small geographic
service areas at auction, in an attempt to accommodate the
needs of both large and small providers.65 For example, in the
57. Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5, at 1171.
58. Dave Molta, Regulating the Airwaves, NETWORK COMPUTING, Aug. 5,
2004, at G12, G12.
59. For an example of how the FCC divided the broadband PCS band, see
John A. Rogovin & Rodger D. Citron, Lessons from the Nextwave Saga: The
Federal Communications Commission, The Courts, and the Use of Market
Forms to Perform Public Functions, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 687, 697 (2005).
60. For an example of how the FCC divided the AWS band and assigned
geographic designations, see Service Rules, supra note 50, at 651–59.
61. The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau provides a listing and descriptions of the various geographic licensing schemes the FCC has used in its
auctions. Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, FCC, Maps: Geographic Licensing
Schemes, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=maps (last visited
Apr. 10, 2006).
62. Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, FCC, Regional Economic Area Groupings
Map, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/maps/reag.pdf (last visited Apr. 10,
2006) [hereinafter REAG Map].
63. Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, FCC, Cellular Market Areas Map,
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/maps/rsamsa.pdf (last visited Apr. 10,
2006).
64. Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, FCC, Economic Areas Map,
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/maps/ea.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2006)
[hereinafter EA Map].
65. Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5, at 1210 (“In recent years, the
Commission has continued to embrace geographic area licensing . . . to accommodate licenses encompassing very large service areas as opposed to
smaller site-based licenses.”).
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upcoming auction for advanced wireless services in the 1.7 GHz
and 2.1 GHz band, the FCC is auctioning different bands of
spectrum using REAGs, EAs, and CMAs.66 Large geographic
service areas benefit providers with a national footprint,67 because with only one transaction, they are able to cover much of
their service area.68 There is no need to negotiate aggregation
agreements with other bidders or license winners; thus transaction costs are reduced. Conversely, small providers prefer
small geographic service areas, which are typically auctioned at
lower prices and more closely match their local footprints.69
EAs attempt to balance these competing interests. They can be
combined to form REAGs,70 but are small enough to be relatively affordable for small providers.71
Moreover, the Commission mitigates the impact of disparate access to capital markets by offering bidding credits to rural telephone companies and small businesses through the designated entity program.72 Each particular auction’s service
rules specify the bidding credit levels available for rural telephone companies.73 The bidding credit level for small businesses varies from 15 to 35 percent; the smaller the company,

66. See Service Rules, supra note 50, at 648, 652.
67. A footprint is “that portion of the Earth's surface over which a satellite
antenna delivers a specified amount of signal power under specified conditions.” INST. FOR TELECOMM. SCIENCES, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN.,
TELECOM GLOSSARY (2000), http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/dir-016/_2287
.htm.
68. See Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission’s Rules—Competitive
Bidding Procedures, 21 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1231, 1252 (Aug. 14, 2000)
(noting that large service areas may be appropriate for satellite-based services).
69. See, e.g., Comments of the National Telecommunications Cooperative
Association, Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural
Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to
Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT Docket No. 04-356, at 2–3 (Nov. 23,
2004),
http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_
document=6516883063.
70. Compare EA Map, supra note 64, with REAG Map, supra note 62.
71. See Service Rules, supra note 50, at 648 (“EA licensing areas offer[ ]
realistic opportunities for local, largely rural carriers to afford adequate spectrum for voice and advanced data services in markets of manageable size
suited to their existing operations.”).
72. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(f) (2005).
73. See id.
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as defined by statute, the greater the deduction.74 A bidding
credit is the equivalent of a “payment discount.”75 After the
bidding process is complete, the FCC deducts this predetermined percentage from the actual bid price. The designated entity pays only this reduced price for the license.76
The Commission recognizes that these methods, along with
others not discussed here,77 have not been sufficiently successful at getting spectrum into the hands of rural providers. Thus,
the Commission has increasingly relied on secondary markets
as a means to meet the spectrum needs of rural providers.78 For
example, if a geographic service area exceeds the licensee’s
footprint, the licensee may lease, partition, or disaggregate excess spectrum to another provider, often a small rural carrier.79
The Commission has also considered whether alternative or
supplemental methods are needed to facilitate spectrum access
in rural areas.80 One approach is the “keep what you use” policy, under which the Commission would reclaim fallow spectrum and relicense it to other providers if not used within a
specified time.81 The Commission has also considered whether
to adopt an easement policy or substantial service requirements for license renewal.82

74. Id. § 1.2110(f)(2)(i)–(iii).
75. Id. § 1.2110(f).
76. Id.
77. Other methods include a competitive bidding process for initial licensing, base station power level rules, substantial service and construction requirements, infrastructure sharing limitations, and rural utilities service loan
program policies. See Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5, at 1164–66.
78. See Efficient Use of Spectrum 2003, supra note 45, at 663–65 (highlighting “efforts to facilitate secondary markets in spectrum”).
79. See 47 C.F.R. § 27.15; Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5, at
1172–74 (“Geographic partitioning and spectrum disaggregation are available
to promote efficient spectrum use and economic opportunity by a wide range of
applicants, including rural telephone companies.”).
80. Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5, at 1165 (“In December 2002,
the Commission released a Notice of Inquiry that sought comment on the effectiveness of its existing regulatory tools in promoting service to rural areas
and asked how we could modify our policies to further encourage the provision
of wireless services in rural areas.”).
81. Id. at 1213–16. The FCC has already applied the keep-what-you-use
approach to some services. See id. at 1174–76 & nn.103–04 (discussing the cellular and PCS approaches).
82. Id. at 1216–19.
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II. CURRENT AND PROPOSED ALLOCATION
METHODS ARE INSUFFICIENT
In some respects, the current and alternative spectrum
management methods are a step in the right direction. For example, utilizing diverse geographic-area licensing, designatedentity bidding credits,83 and secondary markets has made great
communications inroads into some of the most isolated areas of
the country.84 Each of these methods, however, has also created
more difficulties. Geographic-area licensing results in economic
inefficiency; secondary markets are underutilized and often
force unfavorable terms onto small rural providers; and a keepwhat-you use system is both economically inefficient and would
likely fail to increase services in rural areas. This Part explores
each of these difficulties.
A. GEOGRAPHIC-AREA LICENSING AND ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCY
It is extremely difficult to structure an auction that both
facilitates the provision of rural services and avoids frustrating
the footprints of national providers.85 The Commission must
both determine what size geographic areas to use and in which
frequency bands to use them.86 Such decisions depend not only
on technical factors, like propagation characteristics and service allocations, but also on a prediction of what the providers’
future spectrum needs will be. If the Commission errs on the
side of making the geographic areas too large, licensees end up
with excess spectrum that other bidders may have otherwise
used.87 Conversely, if the geographic areas are too small, national providers may have difficulty acquiring the spectrum
83. See Service Rules, supra note 50, at 648, 660–61 (noting the success of
designated entities in winning licenses in several recent spectrum auctions).
84. See Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5, at 1165–68 (referring to
the success certain policies have had in providing wireless services in rural
areas).
85. See Rules Regarding 5.9 GHz Band, supra note 56, at 23,165.
86. For example, in the upcoming Advanced Wireless Services Auction for
the 1710–1755 and 2110–2155 MHz bands, frequencies in Block A will be licensed as EAs. Blocks B, C, and E will be licensed as REAGs. Only Block D
will be licensed using CMAs. Service Rules, supra note 50, at 648, 651.
87. See Comments of Rural Cellular Association, Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural Areas and Promoting Opportunities
for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT
Docket No. 02-381, at 12 (Dec. 29, 2003), http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6515383162 (“The effect of excessively large or inefficiently sized geographic license areas is a lost opportunity to allow spectrum to reach an entity that would make better use of it.”).

TONSAGER_3FMT

2006]

05/17/2006 09:17:13 AM

SPECTRUM POLICY

1519

necessary to cover their footprint.88 Mutually destructive bidding—where a bidder is left with an incomplete license set that
has a total price greater than its value—may occur.89 Although
EAs attempt to balance the needs of national and rural providers, they do not offer an efficient solution because aggregation
by large providers and partitioning by small providers involve
transaction costs.90
B. SECONDARY MARKETS
Secondary markets provide the means of correcting some of
these inefficiencies by allowing re-allocation of fallow spectrum.91 Under this method, large providers partition or disaggregate small portions of their geographic area to rural providers.92 Leasing portions of the spectrum is also an option.93
However, these transactions raise several difficulties.
First, each secondary market transaction involves significant transaction costs,94 which the national provider may not
88. See Peter Cramton, The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions, 41
J.L. & ECON. 727, 730–31, 733–34 (1998) (discussing how large providers aggregated licenses in nine FCC spectrum auctions from 1994 to 1996). The author recognizes that some providers had to pay more in order to acquire spectrum needed in adjacent bands and that it is sometimes difficult to convince
the neighboring licensee holder to transfer the spectrum rights. Id. at 730–31.
89. Lawrence M. Ausubel et al., Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence
from the Broadband PCS Auctions, 6 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 497, 499–
500 (1997).
90. See Comments of the National Telecommunications Cooperative
Association, Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural
Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to
Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT Docket No. 02-381, at 6 (Jan. 14, 2005),
http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_
document=6516887645 [hereinafter Comments of the NTCA 2005] (“There are
costs involved with negotiating with another carrier to make spectrum
available in secondary markets and the financial gain may not be worth the
trouble for the large carrier.”).
91. See Efficient Use of Spectrum 2000, supra note 7, at 2067 (noting that
“enabling the development of more robust secondary markets will help promote spectrum efficiency and full utilization” by facilitating the use of “spectrum [that is] used inefficiently by its current licensees or . . . lie[s] fallow”);
Ward, supra note 47, at 104.
92. See Efficient Use of Spectrum 2000, supra note 7, at 2068–71 (summarizing various leasing arrangements).
93. See Ward, supra note 47, at 104.
94. Peter Cramton, Spectrum Auctions, in HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS 605, 609 (Martin Cave, Sumit Majumdar, & Ingo Vogelsang eds., 2002) (“[T]ransaction costs are not zero. Postauction transactions
often are made difficult by strategic behavior between parties with private information and market power . . . . The problem is that the license holder exer-
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be willing to absorb95 and the rural provider may not be able to
afford. Second, large providers may be unwilling to partition
spectrum, based on an economic calculation that it could be the
“beachfront” property of the future, even though it currently is
not profitable. The communications industry is constantly
changing. New technologies and federal regulations, like bandclearing96 and relocation,97 alter the way providers make decisions. These changes potentially could make spectrum in even
rural areas extremely profitable.
Third, large providers may be unwilling to partition because they believe large spectrum areas will be more attractive
to future buyers, increasing the purchase price.98 Fourth, rural
providers may be unwilling to lease spectrum. Because providing communications services involves significant capital investment, a rural provider may hesitate to take on such investment without some assurance the lease will be renewed,
and on favorable terms. The statutory limits on the length of
FCC licenses99 frustrate the possibility of long-term leases.
Even if the licensee and the rural provider could agree on a
long-term lease based on the licensee’s renewal expectancy, the
licensee likely would be cautious to do so because encumbered
spectrum will be difficult to sell to future buyers, or will at
least fetch a lower price. Put differently, the longer the lease
terms, the more likely that problems associated with partitioning will arise. Finally, with respect to both partitioning and
leasing, when large providers obtain licenses that cover areas
larger than their own footprint and overlap the service areas of
rural providers, the parties have vastly unequal bargaining
power when it comes to negotiating the terms of the deal.100
cises its substantial market power in the resale of the license.”).
95. Comments of OPASTCO, supra note 6, at 11.
96. See Neil Roland, Deadline Set for Digital-TV Conversion, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 20, 2005, at E1 (discussing legislation requiring television broadcasters to move to digital signals so that emergency service workers could use
the analog waves).
97. See Peter Cramton et al., Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents,
41 J.L. & ECON. 647, 647–48 (1998).
98. Comments of OPASTCO, supra note 6, at 11.
99. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1) (2000) (limiting the license for operation of a
broadcasting station to eight years); 47 C.F.R. § 27.13 (2005) (setting the license period for various frequencies at either eight or ten years).
100. See Comments of Rural Cellular Association, Facilitating the
Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural Areas and Promoting
Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based
Services, WT Docket No. 02-381, at 3 (Jan. 13, 2005), http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/
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These concerns present real barriers to participation in the
secondary markets. Although some rural providers claim that
the secondary market rules have increased their access to spectrum,101 such instances typically involve rural providers forming cooperative ventures with a national company.102 For various reasons, few rural providers desire to be in such a position.
Some providers fear losing their designated entity status if they
enter into such an agreement.103 Rural providers may wish to
avoid the unfavorable terms included in such deals, such as
disadvantageous roaming or pricing provisions, and limits on
the types of technology they can use.104 One commenter noted
that “[t]he small operator also must accept the large carrier’s
imposition of complexity in the transaction and the ongoing operating standards, all of which exacerbate the expense for the
small company.”105 Providers who prefer a small size and community focus simply may want to remain independent from the
large, national providers. Others may be unable to enter into
such partnerships because of various antitrust or crossownership limitations.

prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6516887547
[hereinafter Comments of RCA].
101. For example, Nextel Partners, Inc. noted that these rules “allowed
Nextel Partners to obtain hundreds of partitioned spectrum blocks [and] spectrum usage rights to thousands of station licenses under Commissionapproved leasing arrangements.” Comments of Nextel Partners, Inc. on Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Facilitating the Provision of SpectrumBased Services to Rural Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT Docket No. 02-381,
at iii (Jan. 14, 2005), http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_
pdf=pdf&id_document=6516887636 [hereinafter Comments of Nextel Partners].
102. Id. at 3, 6 (“Nextel Partners has undertaken this buildout in major
part using economic area (EA) licenses originally purchased by Nextel Communications at auction from the Commission.”). Sprint has formed similar alliances. See Sprint Reply Comments, Facilitating the Provision of SpectrumBased Services to Rural Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT Docket No. 02-381,
at 7–8 (Feb. 14, 2005), http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_
pdf=pdf&id_document=6517288314.
103. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110 (2005). Depending on the service rules for the
particular auction, either a rural provider or a provider claiming to be a small
business may be ineligible for a bidding credit due to the increased financial
support from a large provider. See id.
104. Comments of RCA, supra note 100, at 3 (“Roaming rates are specified
by the large carrier in a ‘take it or leave it’ fashion because the large carrier
has little or nothing to lose if no deal is reached.”).
105. Id.
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Absent a partnership with a larger provider, many rural
providers claim they face difficulties when trying to acquire additional spectrum through the secondary markets.106 They argue that the secondary market method is “lengthy, burdensome, and often, unsuccessful.”107 Large carriers often fail to
answer a small provider’s inquiries or refuse to do business
with them.108 In at least one documented instance, a small, rural provider was told that it did not have enough customers to
make an agreement worthwhile.109 The Organization for the
Promotion and Advancement of Small Telecommunications
Companies and the Rural Telecommunications Group claim
that providers have partitioned or disaggregated “far less than
a quarter of one percent of all the licenses sold at auction.”110
C. KEEP WHAT YOU USE
Perhaps the most controversial proposal is the keep-whatyou-use method,111 under which the Commission reclaims fallow spectrum and relicenses it to other providers if not used
within a specified time.112 This allocation method is the most
inefficient and the least likely to facilitate the provision of
communications services in rural areas. It is highly inefficient
because it requires the FCC to determine through field testing
what spectrum a licensee is using and what spectrum lies fallow.113 The Commission must then determine which providers
106. See, e.g., Comments of the NTCA 2005, supra note 90, at 3.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Comments of OPASTCO, supra note 6, at 10.
111. Compare Comments of the NTCA 2005, supra note 90, at 4–8
(supporting the keep-what-you-use approach), with Reply Comments of
Cingular Wireless, Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to
Rural Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to
Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT Docket No. 02-381, at 2–6 (Feb. 14,
2005),
http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_
document=6517288274 (arguing that a keep-what-you-use approach is
“draconian regulation”), and Reply Comments of AT&T Wireless Services,
Inc., Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural Areas and
Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide
Spectrum-Based Services, WT Docket No. 02-381, at 4–9 (Jan. 26, 2004),
http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_
document=6515583742 [hereinafter Reply Comments of AT&T] (arguing that
a keep-what-you-use approach is unnecessary).
112. Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5, at 1213–16 (summarizing
keep-what-you-use relicensing measures).
113. See id. at 1214 (discussing the difficulties of assessing spectrum use).
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should receive access to the unused spectrum instead.114 Such
oversight is likely to be time- and resource-intensive because
both of these procedures involve high transaction costs.115
Moreover, the benefits to be gained from such a reclamation policy are likely minimal. Rural providers face the same
high economic hurdles to deployment as do national providers,
and they lack the advantages of economies of scale. Consequently, although keep-what-you-use increases rural access to
spectrum, rural providers working under this method will not
necessarily be able to deploy rural communications networks
and provide advanced services to rural consumers any more
quickly than do current licensees.116 Given these circumstances, it is preferable to avoid high enforcement costs and
leave the spectrum in the hands of the licensee, who may decide to deploy networks in the future.
Complex problems demand complex answers. Geographicarea licensing and secondary markets are appropriate for some
services, but no currently accepted or proposed method offers a
comprehensive solution to the inadequate provision of communications services in rural America. Rather, a multipronged
approach that balances the needs of both large and small providers is necessary. Because different communications services
present different technical and geographic obstacles, approaches will inevitably vary according to the service being
provided. Therefore, the more tools the FCC has available in its
spectrum toolbox, the more likely it is to successfully fix the
leaks in the system. The remainder of this Note proposes an
FCC regulation modeled after the doctrine of adverse possession, as an additional tool for increasing communications services in rural areas.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION AS
A MODEL FOR FCC REGULATIONS
A. THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION
Under the common law doctrine of adverse possession, a
person may acquire another person’s interest in a property by

114. See id.
115. See id. (stating that “adopting the ‘keep what you use’ approach may
result in numerous administrative and legal costs”).
116. See, e.g., Reply Comments of AT&T, supra note 111, at 2.
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possessing it for a specified time.117 To bring a successful claim,
the adverse possessor must establish that the possession is actual, open and notorious, exclusive, hostile, and continuous.118
Each element must have existed concurrently for the requisite
duration, and failure to prove one element is fatal to the
claim.119 The adverse possessor also must intend to claim title
to the property possessed.120
The adverse possessor can establish the first element, that
the possession is actual, by entering onto the land121 and asserting that “dominion which owners usually exercise over
similar lands in the same locality.”122 For example, actions like
building fences,123 living on the land,124 and improving the
property125 are all factors the court may take into consideration
when determining whether possession was actual. Mere constructive possession or a subjective belief that the adverse possessor is in possession is insufficient.126 The open and notorious
element requires that the true owner have either actual or constructive knowledge that the property is possessed by another.127 The element recognizes that it would be unreasonable
to take away the rights of those owners who were unable to assert a claim because the adverse possession was indiscoverable.
In order to prove exclusivity, the adverse possessor must
“us[e] and enjoy[] the land as his own.”128 In other words, the
true owner cannot be in joint possession of the property,
whether the joint possessor be the true owner,129 a cotenant, a
third person, or the public.130 Additionally, the adverse possessor must exercise dominion over the land, making those efforts
117. See 7 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY § 1012 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2005).
118. See, e.g., In re Connor, 302 B.R. 509, 515 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2003); Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206, 211 (D.R.I.
2002); 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession §§ 29, 65 (2005).
119. See, e.g., Belotti v. Bickhardt, 127 N.E. 239, 241 (N.Y. 1920).
120. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 30 (2005).
121. Id. § 35.
122. Id. § 37.
123. See id. § 40.
124. Id. § 39.
125. Id. § 41.
126. Id. § 34.
127. Id. § 55.
128. Ward v. Cochran, 150 U.S. 597, 606 (1893) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
129. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 59 (2005).
130. Id. § 60.
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expected of a reasonable owner to eject trespassers and otherwise use the land.131
Jurisdictions differ on what an adverse possessor must do
to establish hostility. Some jurisdictions require merely that
the adverse possessor claim ownership over the property to establish that the possession is hostile to the rights of the true
owner.132 In such jurisdictions, it is irrelevant whether the adverse possessor subjectively believes he has title to the property.133 Other jurisdictions, however, refuse to reward individuals who know they are acting wrongfully. These
jurisdictions require that the adverse possessor have color of
title, often a court judgment or document (such as a defective
deed) that purports to give title, but is deficient in some respect.134 Still other jurisdictions allow for a shorter statutory
time period if the adverse possessor has color of title.135 The final element, requiring that possession be continuous, merely
reaffirms that the possession must last for the entire statutory
period,136 which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.137
These requirements generally are meant to encourage the
true owner to take legal action to protect her rights if someone
is trespassing on her property.138 The doctrine applies to both
real and personal property;139 however, a person cannot adversely possess property of the federal government.140
Several different policy justifications support the adverse
possession doctrine.141 First, insofar as an adverse possessor
may use the doctrine defensively to prevent the true owner
from bringing an action against him, it operates as a statute of
limitations and saves courts from having to decide “stale
131. See id. § 58.
132. See id. § 64.
133. See Per C. Olson, Comment, Adverse Possession in Oregon: The BeliefIn-Ownership Requirement, 23 ENVTL. L. 1297, 1298 (1993) (“The majority of
states disregard the claimant’s actual belief in ownership.”).
134. See, e.g., Weldon v. Heron, 432 P.2d 392, 393 (N.M. 1967).
135. E.g., Field Measurement Serv., Inc. v. Ives, 609 S.W.2d 615, 620 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1980).
136. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 149 (2005).
137. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-101 (2004) (eighteen-year period),
with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-503 (2004) (fifteen-year period).
138. Ottavia v. Savarese, 155 N.E.2d 432, 435 (Mass. 1959); 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 29 (2005).
139. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession §§ 10, 315 (2005).
140. Id. § 12.
141. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse
Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1127–28 (1984).
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claims.”142 This justification recognizes that “the quality and
quantity of evidentiary material deteriorates over time,” making judicial resolution of claims more expensive, timeconsuming and inefficient.143 It also serves a repose function for
potential defendants.144 Second, the doctrine quiets property titles and thereby facilitates property transfers.145 Limiting the
time in which persons may lay claim to property decreases
transaction and information costs involved in transferring
property.146 For example, the doctrine limits the necessary
scope of title searches.147
Third, from the possessor’s perspective, the doctrine protects any reliance interest she may have from development of
and investments in the property over time.148 The adverse possessor “gains title because she has justifiably relied on the true
owner’s failure to eject her while she made obvious and lasting
investments. The wrongfulness of her conduct diminishes in
light of the titleholder’s complete failure to act.”149 Fourth, the
doctrine recognizes that a true owner who fails to initiate action against the adverse possessor has neglected to assert his
rights and, in effect, has abandoned the property.150 Historically, the doctrine also recognized a societal interest in the development of land.151 If another party was able to put fallow
land to use, it was considered more valuable for society to have
title in that person.152
142. Hewes v. Bruno, 424 A.2d 1144, 1145 (N.H. 1981); Merrill, supra note
141, at 1128.
143. Merrill, supra note 141, at 1128.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1129.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1131.
149. Olson, supra note 133, at 1297.
150. See Merrill, supra note 141, at 1130; 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 1
(2005).
151. See Meyer v. Law, 287 So. 2d 37, 41 (Fla. 1973), superseded by statute,
FLA. STAT. § 95.16 (1974). As people have come to realize the value of green
space and environmental conservation, this justification has lost favor. See,
e.g., John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 816 (1994).
152. See, e.g., Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d 431, 435 (Wash. 1984) (“The
doctrine of adverse possession was formulated at law for the purpose of,
among others, assuring maximum utilization of land . . . .”); Sprankling, supra
note 151, at 874 (noting Richard Posner’s claim that “adverse possession
maximizes the combined utility of both the true owner and the claimant by
shifting property—whether wild or developed land—to a higher-valued use”);
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B. ADVERSE POSSESSION AS A MEANS OF LICENSE TRANSFER
The Federal Communications Commission should enact
regulations, modeled after the common law doctrine of adverse
possession, as a means of license transfer between a licensee
and an adverse possessor actually providing communications
services in rural America. A rural provider can argue that the
licensee, by allowing the spectrum to be adversely possessed,
has effectively abandoned his rights to use the spectrum and
any quasi-property rights he may have in the spectrum, even
though that provider is unable to obtain fee simple title to the
spectrum from the government.153 Under such a regulatory regime, the adverse possessor could argue for a license transfer
from the FCC for the portion of the spectrum adversely possessed. In effect, the FCC would create a new license for the
adverse possessor over the relevant area and would modify the
existing license to reflect changes in its geographic reach. The
adverse possessor would not acquire private ownership rights
in the spectrum; rather, he would obtain the rights to use the
spectrum acquired under the license under terms negotiated
with the FCC.
As under traditional adverse possession doctrine, the regulatory scheme would require the rural communications provider to prove its possession was actual, open and notorious,
hostile to the true owner’s claim of right, exclusive, and continuous for a statutorily prescribed amount of time.154 Actual
possession likely would be the most difficult requirement to
prove. The rural provider would show actual possession by
proving its signal has covered a particular geographic area. Because factors such as atmospheric conditions and receiver quality affect the distance a signal travels,155 it may be difficult for
the service provider to establish the boundaries of the area it
actually served. In the alternative, an adverse possessor could
demonstrate actual possession through customer locations. Under such an approach, the license would reflect the area covering just past the reach of the customers served. The FCC could
allow for a reasonable area of expansion as part of the new license terms.

William B. Stoebuck, The Law of Adverse Possession in Washington, 35 WASH.
L. REV. 53, 53 (1960).
153. See 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 12 (2005).
154. See supra notes 117–37 and accompanying text.
155. See EMERY, supra note 16, at 100–01.
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The rural communications provider would have an easier
time proving “open and notorious” possession. By broadcasting
a signal, the provider puts the licensee on notice that another
party is using its spectrum because the provider’s signal would
interfere with the licensee’s signal and the licensee could pick
up the signal by tuning into the relevant frequency. Similarly,
because interference results when two signals are broadcast on
the same frequency, broadcasting a signal free from interference would prove exclusivity.
Since only one user may successfully transmit information
simultaneously over the same frequency without causing interference,156 the regulations would presume hostility. In order to
counter the presumption, the licensee would need to prove that
the rural provider had permission to use the signal. The FCC
regulations would stipulate that proof of continuous possession
will vary according to the service provided. For example, because a broadcast radio signal may go off air during the late
night hours, a rural provider may satisfy the continuous element even though it operates only between the hours of six
a.m. and ten p.m. A rural provider of mobile phone services,
however, would need to prove the services are available at all
times, since phone service is needed around the clock. As more
and more adaptive devices, like cognitive radios,157 are developed and enter the market, the continuous and uninterrupted
use of spectrum will become, in a sense, impossible. Such adaptive devices are able to interact “with [their] environment to determine transmitter parameters such as frequency, power, and
modulation,”158 and consequently can use various frequencies
as they become available. However, because such technology
will allow for spectrum sharing without resulting interference,
these technologies should not be considered interruptions in the
possession. Rather, insofar as the rural communications service
provider utilizes the spectrum in the same manner as would
the prudent spectrum licensee for the requisite duration, it
would meet the continuous possession requirement.
Having proven each requirement, the rural provider would
be granted a presumptive claim against the licensee for a license transfer. The licensee would have the opportunity to ar156. See ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 100.
157. Michael J. Marcus, Unlicensed Cognitive Sharing of TV Spectrum: The
Controversy at the Federal Communications Commission, IEEE COMM. MAG.
May 2005, at 24, 24.
158. Id.
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gue that the adverse possessor is not operating in the public interest, or to provide other arguments against transfer. The
regulations would provide, however, that the licensee’s payment for the license at auction does not defeat the rural provider’s claim because payment for the license does not satisfy
the public interest standard.159
Through the license transfer, the rural provider would acquire rights to use the portion of the spectrum adversely possessed. The regulations would also provide that the Commission may modify the terms of the license to better serve the
public interest, convenience, and necessity. Allowing these
types of adjustments to the terms of the license is a divergence
from traditional adverse possession, which limits the title acquired to that which the owner had.160 However, this regulatory provision would allow for flexibility and innovation in the
types of services provided in rural areas. For example, modifications to the license might permit the adverse possessor to
provide different services and use other technologies or could
extend the length of the license period.
C. THE STATUTORY PERIOD MUST ALLOW ENOUGH TIME FOR
THE LICENSEE TO DEVELOP A PRIMARY FOOTPRINT
The most problematic aspect of an adverse possession
method would be determining how long the rural provider must
adversely possess the spectrum before he can claim a license
transfer. On the one hand, national providers need enough time
to build networks in both urban and rural areas. It is economically inefficient for them to build in rural areas first, since they
generally recover the costs associated with rural deployment
through urban customers’ subscription charges.161 Instead,
these providers often plan on expanding their primary footprints into rural areas at a later date, or when technologies
make deployment cheaper.162

159. The public interest standard is established in 47 U.S.C. § 309(a)
(2000).
160. See POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 117, § 1012.
161. See Comments of Nextel Partners, supra note 101, at 4 (“While the
company initially focused on building out the more populated areas in order to
achieve sufficient customer numbers and hence the cash flow needed to arrive
at a level of financial sustainability, Nextel Partners is now actively pushing
coverage into more and more areas of low population density.”)
162. See id. at 4–5.
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On the other hand, delays in providing rural service
threaten not only economic development, education, and personal convenience, but also public safety. Any formulation of
the public interest standard ought to support a regime that encourages deployment by one who can do it now, even if at the
expense of someone who could do it later. Congress’s mandate
to facilitate deployment in rural areas supports this conclusion.163 While immediate deployment may not make keen financial sense for national providers, the Commission is not at
liberty to deal with rural areas as an afterthought.164 Therefore, the statutory period should allow the provider sufficient
time to build out its primary footprint. Filed comments indicate
that five years is a sufficient period.165
Critics will likely argue, as they do against spectrum reclamation policies in general, that such a short statutory period
would encourage uneconomic investment.166 Licensees would
have to “choose between making uneconomic investments or
losing spectrum in rural areas.”167 It is true that they would
have to make that choice, but a rational, profit-motivated licensee will never choose an uneconomic investment. Not all spec-

163. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 301 (2000).
164. See Reply Comments of Dobson Communications Corporation, Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based
Services, WT Docket No. 02-381, at 7–8 (Feb. 14, 2005), http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/
prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6517288353 (“[C]arriers serving rural areas need additional time to successfully implement their
business plans, so while spectrum may go unused today, there is no reason to
believe, with advances in technology and service offerings, that such spectrum
will not be needed tomorrow as part of a company’s overall business plan.”).
Unlike corporations, the FCC is prohibited from basing its licensing decisions
on the likelihood of increased federal revenues. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (7)(b) (2000).
165. Comments of Nextel Partners, supra note 101, at 4 (claiming that
Nextel Partners was able to complete deployment of its primary footprint
within five years and that after those first five years, it then started the expansion phase of its footprint).
166. See, e.g., Reply Comments of Verizon Wireless, Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural Areas and Promoting Opportunities
for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT
Docket No. 02-381, at 4 (Feb. 14, 2005), http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6517288322.
167. Reply Comments of Nextel Partners, Inc., Facilitating the Provision of
Spectrum-Based Services to Rural Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT Docket No.
02-381, at 2 (Feb. 14, 2005), http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6517288298 [hereinafter Reply Comments of
Nextel Partners].
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trum is created equal.168 To the extent that the geographic area
bid upon exceeds the provider’s footprint, there would be
steeply diminished marginal returns on the “unused” spectrum
during the time it is being adversely possessed. Therefore, losing the rights to use such spectrum through a license transfer
would not diminish the current rate of return of the remaining
spectrum license for the licensee.
Moreover, even if the rural area spectrum did seem nominally valuable, the licensee would still invest first in utilizing
urban area spectrum, for which deployment costs are lower and
the number of potential consumers is higher. The provider
would always choose to deploy in urban markets first because
those markets are more profitable. Therefore, allowing adverse
possessors to gain the rights to rural spectrum still would not
encourage national providers to make unsound investments.
D. THE COST OF PROVIDING SERVICES IN RURAL AMERICA:
SOLVING AN UNBALANCED EQUATION
Even though it is extremely expensive to deploy communications networks in rural areas where there are few paying
customers, rural providers will build networks and provide services to rural America. Small rural companies do not use the
same economic calculus that national providers use. Many of
these small rural providers are cooperatives,169 formed because
members of the community realize that access to advanced
communications services not only improves the quality of life
for rural residents, but also ensures the survival of the community.170 On an individual level, some members may want digital
cell phone services so they can effectively dial 9-1-1 in case of
an emergency; others may need broadband in order to keep a
small business afloat. On a community-wide level, the availability of advanced communications services in small towns is a
significant factor in attracting a business to an otherwise deserted Main Street.171 Recognizing the necessity of these ser168. See EMERY, supra note 16, at 100–02.
169. See Comments of the NTCA 2005, supra note 90, at 1, 5 (“Half of
NTCA’s [560+] members are organized as cooperatives.”); Comments of
OPASTCO, supra note 95, at 2 (“OPASTCO is a national association of over
550 small telecommunications carriers serving rural areas of the United
States. Its members, which include both commercial companies and cooperatives, collectively serve over 3.5 million consumers.”).
170. See Comments of the NTCA 2005, supra note 90, at 5; Comments of
the NTCA 2003, supra note 6, at 3.
171. See Lloyd, supra note 7, at 1.
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vices, cooperatives may be willing to provide these services
even if they are able to make only a small profit or break
even.172
Even if the rural provider is operating for profit, the economic calculation varies from that of a national provider. Because rural companies operate at a local, rather than national
level, they likely have a better sense of who their customers
are, what services they need, and what price they can afford.
This knowledge ought to reduce their need to invest in consumer research and market testing. They may also be able to
rely on word-of-mouth advertising to attract customers, rather
than multimillion dollar campaigns.173
Additionally, rural providers do not have the same opportunity costs as national providers. For the national provider,
investment in a rural area involves the opportunity cost of not
investing in more profitable urban markets. However, because
the urban markets are not a part of the rural provider’s portfolio, this opportunity cost is nonexistent. Finally, what seems
like a small profit to a national provider may likely seem like
significant cash to a small rural provider.174
It is true that there is a risk that the licensee may defeat
the rural provider’s adverse possession claim by bringing an interference action against the provider at the FCC. To mitigate
the potential for lost investment, the FCC could implement
mechanisms to counter this threat. For example, the FCC could
waive penalties for unauthorized transmission if the adverse
possessor provided communications services in an unserved or
underserved rural area.175 Additionally, new regulations could
require that the licensee compensate the rural provider for improvements made to utilize the spectrum, like the building of
towers and other construction. While the common law refuses

172. See, e.g., Comments of the NTCA 2005, supra note 90, at 3–5.
173. In the first nine months of 2005, Verizon spent about $247 million on
advertising, while Comcast spent near $220 million. See AT&T Kicks Off Its
Biggest Ever Ad Campaign, Reuters.com, Dec. 29, 2005, http://today.reuters
.com/business/newsArticle.aspx?type=telecomm&storyID=nN295198.
174. For example, Cingular Wireless, L.L.C., the largest wireless provider
in the United States, had 2004 sales of $19,436,000,000. Cingular Wireless
L.L.C., Hoover’s In-Depth Company Records, Oct. 12, 2005, 2005 WLNR
16521676. Meanwhile, Midwest Wireless Holdings, L.L.C., serving rural areas
in Minnesota, Iowa, and Wisconsin, had 2004 sales of only $36,800,000. Midwest Wireless Holdings, L.L.C., Hoover’s In-Depth Company Records, Aug. 17,
2005, 2005 WLNR 12928974.
175. For a discussion of penalties, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 501–04 (2000).
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restitution when the trespasser has knowledge of a superior title to the property,176 the proposed regulatory regime could differ. The former concerns private property, while the latter involves usage rights contingent on promoting the public
interest.177 Thus, insofar as the rural provider’s use of the spectrum was for the provision of communications service to unserved consumers, the Commission could require compensation
for such investments, despite the rural provider’s knowledge
that its use is unlicensed. It is possible that the rural provider’s
investments would not enrich the licensee. For example, the
technology the adverse possessor invested in could be incompatible with that of the licensee. In such cases, the licensee and
rural provider could negotiate a leasing or disaggregation
agreement in lieu of restitution. Together, these regulatory
provisions would protect the licensee’s interests in the spectrum and encourage rural providers to take the initial risk to
serve ignored areas.
License transfer by adverse possession secures the rural
provider’s investment. Unlike a spectrum lease, which the licensee may not renew, a license transfer under the regulations
would provide the adverse possessor with the licensee’s renewal
expectancy.178 The FCC would renew the license as long as the
transferee could demonstrate that its services met the public
interest standard.179 Guaranteed license renewal180 would encourage rural providers to build out networks and provide services in rural areas.
E. ADVANTAGES OF THE ADVERSE POSSESSION APPROACH
A regulatory adverse possession scheme would complement
the statutorily mandated “public interest, convenience, and necessity” framework.181 Because the doctrine would more effi176. See, e.g., Canal Bank v. Hudson, 111 U.S. 66, 80–81 (1883); James v.
Bailey, 370 F. Supp. 469, 470–72 (D.V.I. 1974).
177. See supra Part I.B.
178. Sidak, supra note 46, at 98–100.
179. Cowles Broad., Inc. (WESH-TV), 86 F.C.C.2d 993 ¶¶ 60–74 (1981).
180. T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH ESTATE 121 (6th ed. 2003) (“The FCC was generally reluctant to deny renewals
except in egregious cases.”); Reed E. Hundt, Keynote Address, A New Paradigm For Broadcast Regulation, 15 J.L. & COM. 527, 533 (1996) (“[T]he Commission for at least fifteen years has not taken away a single one of the approximately 1500 Television licenses or 10,000 radio licenses in this country
for failure to serve the public interest.”).
181. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2000).
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ciently allocate spectrum to providers who have demonstrated a
desire and ability to provide communications services to otherwise unserved or underserved rural residents, it meets the
statutory standard.182
Additionally, an adverse possession approach to spectrum
aligns with many of the doctrine’s policy justifications. The historical justification—that the law should encourage property
use and development183—applies with particular force to spectrum. Spectrum use, unlike land use,184 cannot degrade the
quality of or “pollute” the spectrum. Indeed, the purpose of
spectrum management policy is to encourage the efficient allocation of spectrum so as to maximize the number and types of
communications services available to the public.185 Applying
the adverse possession doctrine to spectrum would encourage
the use and development of licensed spectrum.
The reliance186 and the abandonment187 justifications for
adverse possession are also important in the spectrum context.
Adverse possessors of spectrum usage rights likely would have
to make some capital investment in order to provide rural services.188 The proposed regulatory scheme would protect this re182. See id. §§ 151, 309(j)(3)–(4); Due Diligence Announcement for the Upcoming Auction of Licenses in the Lower 700 MHz Band Scheduled for July 20,
2005, 20 F.C.C.R. 9986 (2005) (“In considering such regulatory requests, the
Commission will consider whether grant of the request would result in public
interest benefits, such as making new or expanded public safety or other wireless services available to consumers or deploying wireless service to rural or
other underserved communities.”); Federal-State Joint Board on Universal
Service, 35 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 958, 972 (Mar. 17, 2005) (“The public interest . . . must be analyzed in a manner that is consistent with the purposes of
the Act itself, including . . . promoting the deployment of advanced telecommunications and information services to all regions of the nation, including
rural and high-cost areas.” (citations omitted)).
183. See Meyer v. Law, 287 So. 2d 37, 41 (Fla. 1973), superseded by statute,
FLA. STAT. § 95.16 (1974).
184. See Sprankling, supra note 151, at 854–62.
185. 47 U.S.C. § 151; see also Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 31 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 586, 607 (Dec. 31, 2003) (separate statement of
Comm’r Adelstein) (“We cannot afford to let spectrum lie fallow. It is not a
property right, but a contingent right to use a public resource—it should be
put to use for the benefit of as many people as possible.”) For some services,
the FCC even mandates the level of service that must be provided under the
license. 47 C.F.R. § 27.14(a) (2005).
186. Merrill, supra note 141, at 1131.
187. See id. at 1130; 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 1 (2005).
188. These investments would be relatively small in low-cost markets, like
radio, but would be potentially quite high in others, like mobile phones. Consequently, the proposed scheme anticipates that existing providers are the
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liance interest by rewarding rural providers for the investments they make during the statutorily defined time period.189
As in the land context, the spectrum licensee who failed to assert his rights against the adverse possessor would in effect
abandon those rights. Such abandonment suggests that the adverse possessor should receive the rights to the spectrum instead.
National providers argue that insofar as rural providers
face the same high investment costs to deploy networks in rural
areas, rural providers will be no more able to serve rural areas
than the licensee and thus do not deserve a license transfer.190
However, the adverse possession approach defeats this argument. By definition, maintaining the adverse possession claim
would require that the rural provider be capable of deploying a
network in an area the licensee has ignored.
Unlike keep-what-you-use programs, which arguably may
force national carriers to make “uneconomic investment[s] in
rural areas,”191 the adverse possession approach only penalizes
licensees when investment in the rural area would have provided an economic benefit from the public’s perspective. In
other words, the rural communications service provider arguing for a license transfer has proven that deployment is economically viable. This demonstrates that the licensee’s decision
not to deploy there, although potentially a sound decision from
the company’s perspective, was not economically sound from
the public interest perspective.
Contrary to the keep-what-you-use method, which requires
extensive FCC oversight, adverse possession is a hands-off,
market-based system. The adverse possessor would discover
fallow spectrum, find a way to use it in an economically feasible
fashion, and enforce the regulations by bringing a transfer
most likely to pursue adverse possession claims. In those instances, adverse
possession would allow existing providers, who have already made significant
capital investments, to expand their existing services or coverage area.
189. Or, as discussed in Part III.D, the regulations would protect the reliance interest by compensating an adverse possessor for his investment if the
licensee brings an interference action before the adverse possession claim ripens.
190. Reply Comments of AT&T, supra note 111, at 6; Comments of Nextel
Partners, Inc., Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural
Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT Docket No. 02-381, at 18–19 (Dec. 29,
2003),
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_
document=6515383231.
191. Reply Comments of Nextel Partners, supra note 167, at 2.
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claim before the FCC. Such a market mechanism would supplement spectrum management policy when the secondary
markets fail.
Finally, an adverse possession method would strike a fair
balance between large, national carriers and small, rural providers. On the one hand, national providers could retain access
to their spectrum rights simply by being responsible stewards
of those rights. Even if a national provider were initially unable
to deploy in rural areas, he would always have the opportunity
to protect his spectrum license by bringing an interference action at the FCC. On the other hand, where national providers
neglect their public interest duties, a rural provider would be
able to answer the call and ensure that all consumers, including those in remote rural regions, have access to the latest
communications services.
CONCLUSION
Rural Americans rely as heavily on advanced communications services for everyday needs and public safety as those
who reside in large cities. Inadequate communications services
in rural areas also affect people who travel through those areas. The wireless communications industry is undergoing great
change, with many technologies making the leap from analog to
digital services. The FCC must take every care to advance Congress’s command that rural Americans not be left behind in the
digital communications revolution.
To fulfill this mandate, the FCC should adopt regulations
based on the common law doctrine of adverse possession as a
means of spectrum license transfer. Such a regime would offer
many benefits, including greater efficiency in spectrum allocation and the potential for increased communications services in
rural America. The adverse possession approach would supplement existing federal spectrum management policy to create
a comprehensive solution to the problem of inadequate access
to spectrum in rural areas.

